More control, less deniability: what next for Russia in Africa after Wagner?

Two weeks later, last Thursday, US officials and Nigerien leaders agreed to a phased withdrawal of American forces from Niger that would take place as soon as feasible in the coming months.

The Telegram message served as status update on recent developments: an exodus of western militaries from the Sahel twinned with expanding Russian influence.

Moscow is keen to extend its sphere of influence on a global scale, find further export markets and access natural resources. Africa presents the perfect opportunity to execute those ideas, some observers say.

Influence is directed through an umbrella entity run by the Russian ministry of defence called Africa Corps, believed to be named after a German outfit in north Africa during the second world war. It has incorporated Wagner group, the controversial paramilitary company that was headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin before his death onboard a jet north of Moscow last August.

In the decade before his death, Prigozhin had forged relationships with the leadership of countries such as Mali, Libya, Central African Republic and others, deploying mercenaries to help tackle insurgencies or provide personal protection for leaders. In return, Wagner got access to mines and infrastructure deals as well as political clout.

He was seen as the conductor of an orchestra of many parts: beyond provision of security, Wagner operatives also worked in mining, election interference, and the manufacturing and disseminating of disinformation.

Analysts say the new arrangement is an indication from Vladimir Putin of a zero-tolerance approach towards independent mercenary forces.

For a long time the Russian state denied any links to Wagner, but that changed with the coup attempt and subsequent death of Prigozhin.

As coups and conflicts in former French colonies caused relations between them and Paris to deteriorate in the last decade, Russia rekindled cold war-era ties across parts of Africa. Hundreds of people showed up at pro-coup rallies draped in white-blue-red colours of the Russian flag, as French ones were burnt around them.

As specks of jihadist activity appear in coastal west Africa, there are fears that they too could dump traditional allies for Moscow.

Ladd Serwat, Africa regional specialist at Acled, said that, in Mali alone, violent events involving insurgent groups had almost tripled since 2021, when Wagner began operations in the country.

As the Russians come in and host states expel other western military and even, in some cases, UN missions, the numerical strength of available personnel for counterinsurgency has been on a decline, rather than rise.

Under the new arrangement, Russian troop arrivals have been restricted to only a few hundred per deployment. Even combined with understaffed local armies, numbers are too low to properly take on armed groups.

Experts say that is a design feature, not a flaw.

Even as Russia is seemingly gaining the upper hand in the Sahel, the situation remains complex, with multiple actors still vying for influence in different countries.

In January, the interim president of Chad, Mahamat Idriss D